Thinking Outside a Black/White Binary In Sports

American racial concretizations have constructed a racially polarized society, where self-identification has become classified based upon individual categorization into a black or white constitutive group. Sports act as a reflection of society, and the narrative surrounding athletes and sporting institutions has similarly been focused on conceptions of identity along a black-white paradigm to avoid pluralistic understandings of race. 

However, the sporting experiences of Latino athletes, a racially ambiguous ethnic group through the lens of the black-white identity binary, have shown the arbitrary nature of that very racial binary, and the fragility of racial boundaries. During the age of US Empire, non-white others delicately manipulated racial perceptions to move beyond black exclusionary sporting practices.

However, Latinos were never accepted as occupying the same sphere as white athletes, and racial standards forced the players to dissociate themselves from their ethnic backgrounds. The continued recognition of Latino “otherness” has proliferated throughout the sporting world today, and the sporting community has marginalized their self-identity and ethnic orientation. While sporting figures existing outside of the black-white paradigm have been able to transverse racial boundaries and slip into sporting leagues, their racial ambiguity has forced them to be identified as outsiders to the game, lacking any real agency beyond the playing field.

In the early 20^th century, Latino baseball players could negotiate the fluid understanding of race in America by defying the racial binary. Latino ballplayers transcended the black-white paradigm because American racial standards were based upon individualized racial consciousness. The very first Latino players in the major league, like Louis Castro and Frank Arellanes, began to blur the color line. Teams allowed for the presence of non-white others in the sport by implying that they did not directly challenge black exclusionary practices to take advantage of cheap Latino labor. Through the racialization of the Latin athlete, Latinos were prescribed a racial identity not based upon their ethnic background, but in comparison to American racial standards.

In his fantastic book Playing America's Game: Baseball, Latinos, and the Color Line, Adrian Burgos said, “Latinos like Castro secured admittance in organized baseball, but this passage to acceptance did not necessarily translate into being accepted as a fellow white.” Latinos were only able to play in the big leagues because of their non-black status, but their foreignness was still pronounced because their identity was conceptualized merely as a differentiation from blackness. Burgos said Latinos “did not wholly reside in the same racial camp as fellow major leaguers,” and Latinos lack of holistic acceptance in baseball implied their lack of accepted whiteness. 

Thus, Latinos had to distance themselves from their ethnic backgrounds, and as Marcos Breton said in his article "Fields of Broken Dreams: Latinos and Baseball", lie about their African ancestry" to associate their racial identification separate from blacks. The only way Latinos could remove their inherent differentiation was through an Americanized process of racialization by distancing themselves from anything that would cause suspicion to the public’s racial perceptions. Latinos could play in the majors based upon their orientation along “Americanized” ethnic standards, but they were never truly accepted, and as Breton said, “they were treated like novelties.” 

While the slew of current Latino baseball players (Yasiel Puig, Jose Fernandez, Yoenis Cespedes, Miguel Cabrera, Robinson Cano, Felix Hernandez, Adrian Beltre, Jose Bautista, Yadier Molina, Carlos Gonzalez to name just a few) have been able to paradoxically transfix racial boundaries by starring in the major leagues, sporting discourse has constantly alienated their identity. Whereas Latinos in the past quietly slipped into the big leagues and failed to alter public sensibilities, Latino ballplayers today often play with a cultural flare while actively displaying their ethnic pride. Although so called "baseball traditionalists" like Goose Gossage ostensibly criticize foreign players for disregarding baseball’s unwritten rules, their underlying antagonism has been rooted in their lack of acceptance of Latinos, and their fear of foreigners taking over the American game. 

Since Dominican outfielder Jose Bautista’s now famous bat flip in game 5 of last year’s ALDS against the Texas Rangers in one of the craziest innings of baseball I have ever seen, Bautista has been defending himself against claims that he was showboating or disrespecting the game. (Russell Martin hitting Shin-Soo Choo's bat throwing the ball back to Aaron Sanchez in the top of the 7th, the game being played under protest, fans in Toronto throwing stuff onto the field, the Rangers making errors left and right in the bottom of the 7th, an interference review, and Bautista's home run all happened in one inning).

Jose Bautista's massive home run and bat-flip

Breton notes that back in the mid-20th century, Latinos faced the same stereotypical criticism because “labels were rooted in negative white perceptions of Latinos, labels that took hold and became a burden even the great players had to carry.” The expressionism of Latino baseball players, like Bautista throwing his bat (that was not just a normal Big Papi bat flip), symbolically threatens American racial and cultural control over foreign players, which has changed from the early 20^th century when Latinos were forced to adhere to the dominant white culture to stay in the league.

There have been many attempts within baseball to suppress Latinos, as evidenced by the fact that after studying "67 bench-clearing incidents in Major League Baseball over the past five seasons [it was] found that the main antagonists hailed from different ethnic backgrounds in 87% of the cases." The “playing the game the right way” argument implies that the correct way to play the game is based upon a white dictation of the sport in reaction to perceived Latino empowerment. Current Braves pitcher Bud Norris said, “If you’re going to come into our country and make our American dollars, you need to respect the game.” Norris's comment showed how the attempts of the baseball community to “normalize” the on-field actions of Latinos have marginalized their freedom.

Off the field, teams exploit players, and Latinos continue to be classified as outsiders. The institutional signing rules of baseball can be aligned with the long American history of imperialism, and reinforces the cultural inequality that baseball players are often trying to maintain on the field. Latin players have particularly been exploited by clubs as a source of cheap labor. 

Every MLB team today, including the San Diego Padres, have a baseball academy in the Dominican Republic. 

In an except from his book Raceball: How The Major Leagues Colonized The Black and Latino Game, Rob Ruck reflected,“Ballplayers today rarely take stands that resonate beyond the ballpark” since Latinos specifically fear any action that could subvert their chance at baseball survival. When Colin Cowherd said on ESPN Radio, “I’ve never bought into that baseball is too complex, a third of the sport is from the Dominican Republican,” he reflected a misunderstanding of the educational opportunities embedded in a racialized society for the non-white community, or the education present in foreign communities.

Furthermore, the presence of Latino players in Major League Soccer has similarly shown attempts to separate white and Latino athletic spheres, and efforts to systemically regulate the behavior of the racially non-white other. Chivas USA, which ceased operations in the league in 2014, was designed as an MLS team to attract Hispanic fans in Southern California, who comprise the largest single ethic group in Los Angeles County.

However, since the MLS consciously segregated its own league by having one team made up of Latino coaches and players, they alienated the Latinos from the rest of the league and symbolized that their presence could only arise in a specific sphere. Moreover, by constructing the team as the US version of a Mexican club team, the MLS did not allow the Latino players on the squad to define their own identity. Brandon Valeriano said on a broader scale in his article from The Washington Post, “We need to understand that the national sport should be a reflection of our views and values,” and the MLS underestimated Latinos wanting to value their American identification and not wanting their identity to be defined as “Mexican,” or as league outsiders.

Greg Maddux Deserves To Be A Unanimous Hall of Famer

In the history of America's national pastime, no player has ever been unanimously selected to the Baseball Hall of Fame. Just mull over and contemplate the implications of that ridiculous and absurd statement for a brief moment. To this date, there has never been a single player to receive every vote for acceptance into Cooperstown. Names that are in baseball lore and are widely accepted as the greatest to ever play the game have not been universally recognized by the baseball writers for perfect entry into the Hall. The fact that some voters have disregarded and neglected the legacy of those who have been the cornerstone of the game and whose careers exemplify as close to excellence as has been seen in the history of the sport is just plain ignorant and ludicrous. The long list of ballplayers who have been unable to crack the unanimous barrier are not equivocal or puzzling to anybody that has watched or followed baseball even fairly closely, which makes it so baffling how some voters could be so futile as to note vote in obvious Hall of Famers on their first ballot. The sense of bewilderment that fans feel towards some of the recalcitrant voters has always been present and this feeling of disdain has only intensified over the past decade with writers leaving names like Ripken and Gwynn off some of their ballots.

It is almost laughable how a variety of the inductees to the Baseball Hall of Fame were not selected by some of the so-called baseball experts. Who were the 23 voters that did not elect Stan Musial to their ballot in 1969, the second best left-handed hitter to ever play behind Ted Williams? How can anybody truthfully explain how the greatest all-around baseball player who ever lived, Willie Mays, did not even appear on 23 ballots in 1979? Did 30 people in 1983 really not vote for the best defensive player to ever step on a diamond in Brooks Robinson? How could 19 writers in 1994 honestly make a claim that Steve Carlton, the second best left-handed pitcher since the 1970's behind Randy Johnson, was not a sure fire Hall of Famer? I would like to know the 28 voters that decided not to put Rickey Henderson on their ballot in 2009, the greatest lead-off hitter in baseball history? How can 16 writers possibly justify leaving the best catcher to ever play the game, Johnny Bench, off their ballot in 1989? Babe Ruth was even left off 11 ballots in 1936, a guy that was so good that his ghost hung over an entire organization for 86 whole years. The thought that baseball immortals like Cobb, Aaron, Wagner, Yastrzemski, Brett, Schmidt, Seaver, Ryan, Gibson, Mathewson, Feller, and Ryan (the list goes on and on) are not recognized as such by some narcissistic voters is nothing short of preposterous.

Obviously, no player goes through their entire baseball career in a perfect manner, as the game is simply a sport of failure. In fact, Mickey Mantle said in 1970, "During my 18 years I came to bat 10,000 times (9,907 to be exact]. I struck out 1,700 times [1,710 precisely] and walked maybe 1,800 times [1,733 to be accurate]. You figure a ballplayer will average about 500 at-bats a season [Mantle averaged a little more than 550 per year in his career]. That means I played seven years without ever hitting the ball." Even the most periodic hitters in baseball history fail more than they succeed. However, Mantle and so many other ballplayers have played at such an extraordinarily high level that it is impossible for anybody to rationally assert that they should not be put into the Hall right away. Often times, writers refuse to vote for historic players because of their own agendas, their dislike towards a player professionally (Ted Williams didn't get some votes because of some troublesome relationships with the media), or some sort of egotism that no guy should go into Cooperstown with a completely unblemished record. However, with Greg Maddux on the ballot in 2014, undoubtedly one of the best five pitchers to ever take the mound, baseball writers have the chance to make up for their past failures and unanimously vote in a player that is universally accepted as one of the greatest of all-time and a no doubt Hall of Famer.

It needs to be remembered that Greg Maddux pitched in a time period where hitting numbers were at an all-time high. The mad dog, who took the major league mound from 1986 to 2008 with the Cubs (1986-1992, 2004-2006), Braves (1993-2003), Dodgers (2006, 2008), and Padres (2007-2008), spent the entirety of his career in the steroid era and pitched to a generation of supposed stars whose performance was being radically enhanced by synthetic drugs. Even aside from steroids, which is a major reason for the increase in runs in the MLB over the past several years, a surge in analytical analysis, tape on every pitch a pitcher has ever thrown, more restrictions on pitchers innings and pitchers, lowering the pitching mound, livening up the baseballs, and decreasing the size of the strike zone has made it ever so difficult for starting pitchers nowadays to be as dominate as those that preceded them.

Let's take a look at Bob Gibson, another pitcher widely recognize as one of the greatest of all-time, for a brief comparison on just how much baseball has changed over the ages. While Gibson is unquestionably one of the best pitchers to have ever lived, he pitched in an era where low ERA's and little run production were the norm rather than the exception. Gibson's 1968 season is certainly astounding by any measure, no matter what time period. Heck, having a 1.12 ERA over an entire season (the fourth lowest all-time behind Tim Keef's 0.86 ERA in 1890, Dutch Leonard's 0.96 ERA in 1914, and Mordecai Brown's 1.04 ERA in 1906) and pitching in 24 games where the opponent scored one run or fewer would be impressive against a team from Eagle, Alaska, not to say major league ball clubs.

However, it cannot be overlooked that in that same season, six other pitchers (Luis Tiant, Sam McDowell, Dave McNally, Denny McLain, Tommy John, and Bobby Bolin) also had an ERA under two. To put just how high that number is in perspective, in the 45 years since 1968, only 19 times have pitchers ever finished with an ERA under two and just four pitchers did so during Maddux's entire career (Maddux in 1994 and 1995, Kevin Brown in 1996, Pedro Martinez in 1997 and 2000, and Roger Clemens in 1990 and 2005). In fact, the .237 batting average of the American and National League that year was the lowest in the history of the game. Meanwhile, Maddux pitched in a completely different time period, where the National League's batting average of .268 in 1999 was the highest for the league since 1939 when guys like Joe DiMaggio, Jimmie Foxx, Ted Williams, Mel Ott, and Hank Greenberg were dominating baseball. While in 1968 the NL scored 5,577 runs, in 2000, the National League tallied up an astonishing 12,976 runs, the most ever scored by a league in a single-season in baseball history. You want more examples? In Gibson's historic 1968 season, just 1.623 percentage of at-bats ended in home runs in the NL, the lowest rate since 1946, but in 2000, there were home runs every 3.386 times a hitter came to the plate in the National League, the highest percentage ever. In fact, although Frank Howard was the only guy in 1968 to hit at least 40 home runs, 16 different ballplayer reached the plateau in 2000. In 1968, the major league slugging percentage of .340 was the lowest since 1918 while in 2000 it was .437, the highest in MLB history.

Nonetheless, when looking at Maddux's numbers, they still stack up very favorably with the greatest players who have ever stepped on a mound to pitch in the major leagues. This is why the time period that Maddux pitched in needs to be considered when looking at just how amazing he was in his career. While everybody around him was having difficulties pitching in an age of high run scoring, Maddux was throwing as if it were the 1960's or 1970's, which makes his career that much more impressive. It was as if Maddux was an anachronism, pitching at levels they were only seen in baseball's stone ages before the game was geared towards an increase in run production. Just look in the next few paragraphs at some of the unprecedented numbers that Maddux put up in his 23-year career despite the ridiculous scoring rates in the majors in the 1990's and 2000's.

Greg Maddux was not a pitcher that would overpower hitters with his velocity, as his fastball only topped out at around the 93 mph mark even in his younger years with the Cubs and in the prime of his career with Atlanta. In fact, Maddux routinely threw fastballs in the mid to high 80's for the majority of his illustrious career. Since the mad dog was not anything close to a power pitcher like a Randy Johnson or a Steve Carlton, he did not strikeout too many opposing hitters, as he only had one season with more than 200 k's (1998). To put that in perspective, Nolan Ryan had 15 seasons with at least 200 strikeouts, Tom Seaver had 10 seasons where he fanned more than 200 batters, and Walter Johnson had 7 consecutive seasons with more than 200 k's from 1911 to 1916.

While Maddux did not have a propensity for strikeouts, he was able to put hitters on their bat foot by always thinking a step ahead, as he was the best cat-and-mouse pitcher anybody has ever seen with his diligent pitching approach. Maddux was a baseball genius and one of the most tactically advanced pitchers to ever step on a big league diamond. There has never been another pitcher in baseball history to have the same accuracy and ability to paint all the corners of the plate as Greg Maddux. His incredible control of the baseball was truly unprecedented, as he out-smarted and out-manipulated so many hitters by changing speeds, being deceptive with his pitch selections, and putting the ball in the exact position he wanted it to go. Maddux's true precision on the mound can be seen in the paucity of walks that he allowed in his career. In the last 80 years dating back to 1933, Maddux's career BB/9 rate of 1.8 ranks in the top 10 all-time (minimum 1,500 innings pitched for starters), only behind Hall of Famers like Robin Roberts and Carl Hubbell. His BB% of 4.9 is also amongst the top 10 lowest in the last 70 years since 1943 (minimum 1,500 innings pitched for starters). Although Maddux did pitch to contact, as he rarely walked opposing batters but also got few strikeouts, he was a ground ball pitcher with his slider and change-up and scarcely got exploited for home run balls. In the last 30 years since 1983, Maddux's HR/9 ratio of 0.63 is the fifth best amongst starting pitchers (minimum 1,500 innings pitched for starters). In fact, in a six year stretch from 1992 to 1997, despite pitching nearly 1,425 innings, the mad dog allowed just 53 home runs in 192 starts or roughly just one home run for every three and a half starts. In 1994, for example, Maddux pitched 202 innings and allowed just 4 home runs the entire season, the last pitcher to have at least those numbers was Marino Pieretti, who did so 68 years ago in 1945 with the Washington Senators when he pitched 233.1 innings and allowed just 3 home runs.

There are a lot of pitchers in the Hall of Fame who had very steady, consistent careers in the major leagues for several years. While Bert Blyleven only had one season with at least 20 wins, just one year with a WHIP under 1.060 (outside of the top 500 for a single-season), and never finished in the top two of the Cy Young in a particular season, he did have an ERA of at least 3.03 in 11 different years in the big leagues and had eight seasons with more than 205 strikeouts. Similarly, Don Sutton, only exceeded 20 wins once in his 23 years in baseball and never had a season with a pitching WAR above 6.6, but he did have 20 years with more than 200 innings pitched and 10 seasons with an ERA of at least 3.06. On the other hand, many pitchers in Cooperstown had a few seasons in the big leagues that were exceedingly brilliant but then did little beyond their great few years. Sandy Koufax is the prime example of this. The left-hander had the greatest six-year stretch in baseball history that included four seasons with an ERA of 2.04 or lower, at least 20 complete games in three separate years, a H/9 of at least 6.5 in four seasons, three seasons with more than 300 innings pitched along with more than 300 strikeouts, and four no-hitters (including a perfect game). However, Koufax only had 165 wins and a career WAR of 53.2 (Cy Young's career WAR was 170.3) because he only pitched 12 seasons due to arm injuries.

However, Maddux had the best of both worlds, as he was a very dependable starter that also had a few historic and unparalleled seasons that will go down as some of the greatest of all-time. The mad dog had a very long and consistent 23-year MLB career. He won 355 games in his time in the big leagues (the 8th most ever by a pitcher and the 2nd most since the 1930's, only behind Warren Spahn) and chewed up innings with 5,008.1 over his career (the 13th most all-time and the 6th most since the 1930's). His adjusted pitching wins of 57.75, win probability added of 59.44 (2nd best behind Roger Clemens), and adjusted pitching runs of 531 are all in the top 6 all-time for a career and his WAR of 104.6 is also the 8th best ever and only behind Roger Clemens and Tom Seaver since the 1930's. Maddux had 7 seasons with a WHIP under 1.050, which has only been bettered by Walter Johnson's 10 seasons under the mark (Johnson had an WHIP under 1.000 9 times in fact). Additionally, Maddux had a seven-year stretch from 1992 to 1998 that included some of the greatest single-seasons that baseball has ever seen from a pitcher. In that span, Maddux went 127-53 with a 2.15 ERA, a 190 ERA+, and a 0.968 WHIP. In 1994 and 1995, Maddux's ERA was below 1.632, which only two pitchers have ever done once since 1918 (Bob Gibson and Luis Tiant in 1968). In fact, Sandy Koufax is the only pitcher aside from Maddux to have two seasons with an ERA under 1.90 since 1918. Maddux also had a ERA+ of at least 260 in both of those seasons, which puts both of them in the top 5 all-time and puts him as the only pitcher along with Walter Johnson and Pedro Martinez to have two seasons with an ERA+ of more than 222. In that 1995 season as well, Maddux's WHIP of 0.811 was the 6th best ever in a single season and the 2nd best since 1913 only behind Pedro Martinez. The mad dog's pitching feats over this historic stretch were recognized, as he won four straight Cy Young awards from 1992 to 1995 (Randy Johnson, who won four consecutive Cy Young awards from 1999 to 2002, is the only other pitcher to win more than 2 in a row). While year-after-year Maddux was amongst the steadiest pitchers in the big league, his amazing stretch in the prime of his career sets him apart from almost any other pitcher of the last four decades.

One of the many things that often gets overlooked in the Hall of Fame process is a player's role in the context of a team or in relation to the success or failure of a ball club, particularly his play in the postseason. Obviously, the Hall is an individual accomplishment for a ballplayer's performance on the field (and off it thanks to betting on games [Pete Rose] and steroids [too long of a list to even begin]). However, while it is rather overt, the point of baseball is to in fact win games and championships and not just accumulate and compile impressive numbers in meaningless innings in order for consideration into Cooperstown. Hall of Famer Phil Niekro, for example, pitched in 864 games (the four most by a starting pitcher all-time behind Cy Young, Nolan Ryan, and Walter Johnson) and won 318 games, but he was never apart of a single playoff victory in his entire 24-year career. While it would not be equitable to claim that it was Niekro's doing that his teams were always below par, it does mean something extra when guys like Maddux build a team up to a title contender. Granted, Maddux did have a Atlanta ball club made up of guys like Javy Lopez, Chipper Jones, Andruw Jones, Mark Wohlers, Tom Glavine, and John Smolz, but a Hall of Fame career should at least be somewhat predicated on a player's ability to improve his team in a way that manifests itself into putting the club in position for victories. Thus, while team success should not be used as a deterrent for players who were on poor MLB clubs, the accomplishments of a team should be seen as a added boost for players' Hall of Fame candidacy.

Maddux was a key figure in the Braves' stretch from 1995 to 2003 in which the team won 9 straight NL East crowns (only the Yankees from 1998 to 2003 have ever won more than 5 division championships in a row), which included three trips to the World Series (1995, 1996, and 1999) and a MLB title in 1995. Maddux's triumphs in the postseason should be like a weighted GPA in school, as you should get more Hall of Fame credit for pitching well in big postseason games, which in this rather odd metaphor, would be like honors classes. In the Braves three World Series appearances, Maddux was the prime reason behind the team's success, as he had a 2.27 ERA in the postseason in 95, 96, and 99 and only had 1 start out of 14 where he didn't last at least 7 innings. Maddux proved clutch time and time again in the postseason with Atlanta, highlighted by his start in game 1 of the 1995 World Series against the Indians, where Maddux threw 9 innings and allowed 2 hits, no walks, and no earner runs in just the Braves 7th World Series since the 1900's. While baseball is not an individual based sport like basketball, where the best players in the world automatically put their team in a title position, the fact that Maddux was the catalysts behind a strong ball club certainly enhances his already loaded Hall of Fame resume.

Maddux's exact place in history can and will be debated for the rest of time. In my estimation, the mad dog is the 2nd best pitcher the majors has seen since the 1940's and is in the number 5 spot all-time behind Walter Johnson, Cy Young, Christy Mathewson, and Tom Seaver. However, one thing that can not be contested is that Maddux is more than deserving of a first-ballot nomination in the Hall and as one of the best pitchers in the history of the sport by all accounts, it would take a really foolish and incompetent voter to not select him. If voters are so stuck up in their ways that they refuse to chose a player not because he isn't worthy of selection but because they believe nobody should be a unanimous pick, than some real changes need to be considered for the Hall of Fame voting.

The Jake Peavy Trade Makes Sense For The Red Sox

"Baseball is a game where you see something new every single day." Most baseball fans have heard this expression a thousand times and while the phase has become somewhat of a cliche, there is no denying the fact that baseball gives its fans some of the most amazing and improbable moments in sports. Events that seem impossible or feats that just sound to absurd to occur can happen at any given time at a ballpark.

You want some examples: a player stealing the same base twice in one inning (Germany Schaefer of the Detroit Tigers in 1908), a triple play without the bat touching the ball (the Seattle Mariners in 2008), two back-to-back home runs by the same two teammates in one inning (Mike Cameron and Bret Boone of the Seattle Mariners in 2002), back-to-back inside the park home runs (Toby Harrah and Bump Wills of the Texas Rangers in 1977), going 0 for 11 in one game (Charlie Pick of the Boston Braves in 1920 in a 26 inning game), get caught stealing four times in one game (Robby Thompson of the San Francisco Giants in 1986), or being a 20-win pitcher on a team that lost more than 100 games (Ned Garver of the St. Louis Browns in 1951 - the Browns won 52 games that year, meaning that Garver won nearly 40 percent of them). And those are just a few of them.

While baseball is certainly a game of inconceivable feats, it is also a sport that is based on patterns, and one of the most common threads amongst playoff teams is a big time move before the trade deadline. In 2011, the St. Louis Cardinals, who eventually went on win the World Series, would not have even made the playoffs if they didn't acquire Rafael Furcal from the Dodgers. Furcal provided defensive stability for a team that committed too many infield errors with Ryan Theroit at shortstop.

Last year, the San Francisco Giants won their second World Series in the last three years largely due to the presence of outfielder Hunter Pence in the lineup, who the Giants acquired in a deadline deal with the Phillies. Not only did Pence help fill the void for the suspended Melky Cabrera, but his bases clearing double in game 7 of the NLCS broke open a 5-run lead against the Cardinals and helped seal the Giants World Series ticket.

This year, the Boston Red Sox, who a year ago had their worst season since they finished 65-89 in 1960, are hoping that their trade deadline deal to acquire former Cy Young winner Jake Peavy will push them over the hump. The trade, which had been discussed for days, was finally able to be completed once the Tigers stepped in and agreed to trade one of their top prospects, Avisail Garcia, to the White Sox. However, the Red Sox had to give up their gifted shortstop Jose Iglesias (to the Tigers) in the process, as you always have to give up a piece in order to improve (unless you're dealing with David Kahn). Overall though, it was a deal the Red Sox had to make and one that will serve them well in the future.

Jake Peavy is by no means the pitcher that he once was with the San Diego Padres. Not only did Peavy benefit from a pitchers ballpark (in Peavy's Cy Young year in 2007, PETCO Park had a park factor of .755, which was by far the most pitcher friendly in the league), but he also had a lot more velocity on his fastball. In 2007, Peavy's average fastball was clocked at 93.9 MPH. However, ever since he underwent surgery in 2010, Peavy's velocity has been greatly diminished, as his average fastball in 2011 with the White Sox was all the way down to 90.4 MPH. In Peavy's prime years with the Padres, like when he had a league best ERA in 2004 (2.27) and 2007 (2.54), the change in speed between his 94-95 MPH fastball and his mid 80's slider made him so effective. However, while a 4-5 MPH difference in fastball velocity may not seem like a lot, it is enough where the difference in speed between the fastball and slider isn't enough to fool hitters anymore. Thus, batters no longer have to worry about getting a fastball blown by them and can sit on the off-speed pitches.

Nonetheless, every MLB pitcher losses velocity as his career goes on (just ask Tim Lincecum and CC Sabathia), and Peavy has begun to figure out how to pitch without blowing the ball past people. While the former Cy Young winner is no longer a number one type pitcher, he is certainly a valuable asset to have in a rotation as a second or third quality pitcher for a potential playoff team like the Red Sox.

Obviously, when a pitcher goes from a last place team to a club that has one of the best records in baseball, it gives them a jolt of energy. However, it is always a concern for teams when a pitcher has been in perennial losing organizations and is not used to the pressure of the postseason or pitching in win or go home games. Despite the fact that in his 12-year career Peavy has pitched in just 2 playoff games, by all accounts, he will have no problem with the tension of a late season race. Peavy is called by some "the bulldog" because of his fearsome and ultra competitive pitching approach, which will fit perfectly in a city like Boston.

Finally, despite some of his struggles the last couple of years, Peavy has looked a lot better on the mound recently, especially since he came off the disabled list. The velocity on his fastball looks improved, as evidenced by his strikeouts per 9 innings rate (8.55) at its the highest its been since 2009. If Peavy can keep his slider down in the zone and limit the number of home runs that opponents hit off him, the Red Sox will have found a starting pitching steal, especially with Clay Buchholz out for an extended period.

Ultimately, transactions in sports are judged not only on how the player you received performs, but on how the player you gave up performs. For example, in 1987 the Detroit Tigers received Doyle Alexander in a trade with the Atlanta Braves for a minor league pitcher that was drafted in the 22nd round, John Smoltz. In the short term, the trade seemed to be a very smart move by Detroit. On the day of the trade (August 12), the Tigers were sitting 1.5 games back of the Toronto Blue Jays in the AL East. Following the trade, Detroit went 33-18 and finished the season 2 games ahead of the Blue Jays, in large part because of the impact of Alexander. In 11 starts with Detroit, the right-hander was 9-0 (he won 8 consecutive starts over a month span) and let up 2 or fewer runs in 8 of those starts. Although Alexander was the main reason why the Tigers made the playoffs in 1987, the trade is widely regarded as one of the worst in baseball history because of the career that John Smoltz went on to have in the big leagues. Smoltz is the only pitcher in MLB history to win 200 games and also have 150 career saves and he is one of just 16 pitchers to ever to have 3,000 career strikeouts. And if that wasn't bad enough for the Tigers: Smoltz is considered one of the best postseason pitchers of all-time. His 15 playoffs wins are the second most all-time behind Andy Pettitte and his 199 postseason strikeouts are the most in the history of baseball.

With all that in mind, the type of player that Jose Iglesias turns out to be will greatly effect how people view the Red Sox trade. Iglesias, who is naturally a shortstop but predominately played third base for the Red Sox, is a defensive wizard. With unbelievably smooth hands and some of the quickest reflexes in the game, Iglesias showed his defensive mastery with the Sox right away. Tigers general manager Dave Dombrowski said, "This guy [Iglesias] is special, defensively... Somebody that has seen him play just sent me a note and said 'In all my years in the game, the only two defensive shortstops I've seen that are better are Ozzie and Vizquel." While this may seem like a bit of an embellishment from a GM that is happy to have a new infielder, Iglesias is widely regarded around all corners of baseball as already having Hall of Fame defensive skills.

The intriguing part about Iglesias is not that he played outstanding, gold glove caliber defense for the Red Sox (which everybody expected him to do), but that he was actually a productive hitter (which nobody thought he could do after batting .204 to begin the season in AAA). In 63 games with the Red Sox, Iglesias hit .330 and had an on-base percentage of .376. On a team with strikeout victims like Mike Napoli and Jonny Gomes, Iglesias was always making contact, as he struckout on just 12.8 percent of his plate appearances (Iglesias had 30 strikeouts and he came to bat 234 times).

However, it was a very smart move by the Red Sox to sell high on Iglesias because his offensive production has been a bit of an aberration. Iggy has benefited more than any other hitter in the big leagues from fortuitous bounces and infield hits that have just found the right hole. For a batter that hits so many ground balls (55.9 percent of all his hits - which would be the 3rd highest percentage in the AL if he had enough plate appearances to qualify) it is perplexing how Iglesias has reached base on so many grounders. In fact, Iggy's .337 batting average on ground balls is abnormally high for any player. Furthermore, on balls that Iglesias hit in play, his batting average was .376 with the Red Sox, which would be the 4th highest in the entire league if he were qualified for the category. While BABIP can certainly show a players hitting capabilities, it often indicates a hitter's level of fortunate at the plate and shows that Iglesias has been having somewhat of a fluky season.

The Red Sox are also trading away a player in a position of strength within the organization, as Boston is loaded with talent along the left side of the infield. In a league that has a dearth of quality shortstops (when Jhonny Peralta is the best SS in the AL you know things are going poorly), Stephen Drew is a more than reliable middle infielder, as shown by his 4.5 Ultimate Zone Rating (a defensive measure to compare what a player did to what an "average" player would do), which is the 5th best in the AL amongst shortstops. Furthermore, while Will Middlebrooks is currently in AAA, the third baseman was so good in his rookie season that the Sox traded away Kevin Youkilis so that he could play the hot corner every day. In just 75 games last year, Middlebrooks had 15 home runs, 54 RBI's, and a .835 OPS and despite his demotion to Pawtucket, Middlebrooks is still a big part of the Sox future.

But the depth that the Red Sox have at shortstop and third base doesn't even end there. Xander Bogaerts, a 20-year old minor league phenom, is the best prospect in the Red Sox farm system, if not the best prospect in all of baseball (Bogaerts is ranked number 3 overall in Keith Law's top prospects list). Although the Sox still need to figure out whether Bogaerts is going to be a shortstop or a third baseman, one thing is for sure: he is going to be the cornerstone of the Red Sox organization for years to come. Also, while Garin Cecchini is still not ready for the big leagues, he is another third base prospect that is well regarded within the Red Sox organization. Cecchini, who is ranked as the 2nd best prospect in the Sox franchise and the 20th best in all of baseball, is batting .337 this season with both Single-A Salem and Double-A Portland.

Anytime you lose a player with the defensive capabilities of Iglesias, it is a tough pill to swallow. However, with all the talent that the Red Sox have on the left side of the infield and Dustin Pedroia signing an extension through 2021, the Sox were going to have no place for Iglesias. Thus, to get a veteran arm like Peavy, in a rotation that has already lost its best pitcher, the trade was a no-brainer for the Red Sox.